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INTRODUCTION
"My ex-husband is 'whopping' my daughter."
One day several years ago an upset and frustrated Ellen
Smith' came to her appointment at my legal aid office. She
explained that her eight-year old daughter had complained
that her father, who had been granted custody in Ellen's earli-
er divorce, had begun disciplining her daughter by hitting her
with a belt until she had black and blue marks. Ellen wanted
custody to be changed.
Over the course of our interview I learned that until sever-
al years earlier, Ellen had a severe alcohol addiction problem.
The state child welfare agency had taken away her first sever-
al children. She had abused many of them. Ellen initially had
lost custody of the eight-year old daughter because of alcohol-
ism and parenting problems. One day, when she had hit the
lowest point she thought possible, she decided to end her ad-
diction. From that time forward her story took on the drama
and achievement of a made-for-television movie. Ultimately,
she had more children and became a responsible, caring par-
ent. She also established ties with some of her older children,
began earning a degree in early childhood education, and coun-
seled other addicted and abusive parents. Over the course of
her case, I developed an intense personal respect and regard
for this client.
'We're being kicked out of our home."
John and Jane Baker came to my office complaining that
their mortgagee, to whom they owed fees for services rendered
to them, was trying to foreclose on their home. I represented
them against their mortgagee. We ultimately decided to settle
the matter by selling the home to the mortgagee.
By the time I had finished representing the Bakers, I had
learned about the reality of their marriage. John had a drink-
ing problem and had, in the past, beaten and abused Jane.
1 I use no client names or identifiable dates in this Article to protect the
identity of my clients and their families.
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John was even arrested for domestic violence and jailed during
the course of my representation of the Bakers.
At times, both of these cases made me question my role in
these clients' lives. During the Bakers' case, had I not met the
termite inspector when the Bakers did not, the sale of the
house would not have closed, and their case would not have
settled. Was it my responsibility as their lawyer to go to their
home to meet the termite inspector? What was my role and
responsibility in regard to the domestic abuse issues faced by
these clients?
There was no denying the significance of my role in the
lives of Ellen Smith and her daughter as I tried to console
myself after an early ruling sent the daughter back to her
abusive father. If I didn't do my job well enough, make the
right choices, or tell the right story, a little girl would be belt-
ed. Now, as an academician, I look back on these and other
cases and ask myself what my role should have been in my
clients' lives.
A recent trend in legal scholarship has been to condemn
poverty lawyers for interpreting the client's2 story into a para-
digm dictated by lawyer understanding.' By so doing, these
scholars argue, the poverty attorney silences the client's
voice,' appropriates the client's story,' and portrays the client
2 Much of the literature in this area refers to a client's story as "client tory"
and to the client's voice as "client voice." See generally, Anthony V. Afieri, Recon-
structive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client NaTative, 100 YALE L.
J. 2107 (1991). I have chosen not to use these terms of art both because they are
awkward and because to my mind they objectify the clients story and imply
disownership by the client of herself and her story. an implication which this
Article disputes.
' Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and
Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stor s, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 861 (1992);
Paul M Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Laug'ering and Sret-Level Bu-
reaucracy, 43 HASTNGS L.J. 947, 950 (1992) [hereinafter "Rebellious Lauyering";
Lucia E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skill, and Sunday Show:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinaftor "Subordi-
nation"]. See also Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practiw. Seven Week
in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEo. LJ. 1603 (1989). But =-e, Binny
Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory,
93 MiCH. L. REV. 485, 524-529 (1994); Paul M. Tremblay, A Tagic View of Poverty
Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. REV. 123 (1992) [hereinafter 'Tragic Vevw"]. For criticism
of poverty lawyers for failure to use welfare litigation to educate and mobilize, see
Lucia E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit. Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535 (1937-88) [hereinaltor
"Mobilization on the Margins"].
' Alfier, supra note 2, at 2118; Anthony V. Alfieri, Spe .ing Out of Turn: The
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as a dependent and inferior object.'
The most overtly critical scholar in this area has been
Professor Anthony Alfieri.7 He and others have called for re-
formative practices which involve greater use of the client's
story in representation of the client. For example, Professor
Alfieri suggests that rather than interpret the client's story,
the poverty lawyer should "integrat[e] ... client narratives
into storytelling."' Lucie White suggests "a practice of lawyer-
ing that would continually cede to 'clients' the power to speak
for themselves."9 These visions of appropriate poverty law
practice involve, in large part, a greater use of client-told story
rather than lawyer-told story and greater control by the client
over the case.
The authors of this narrative literature identify and ad-
dress political and social benefits to a client, such as individual
empowerment, when these sorts of reconstructive practices are
employed by the poverty attorney. But these same authors do
not address the impact of such practices on the results reached
for the individual client. ° Neither does this literature consid-
Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619, 636-37 (1991). For a condem-
nation of courtroom discourse as silencing of poor people, see White, Mobilization
on the Margins, supra note 3, at 543-44; Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court:
Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 536 (1992).
Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2146; Alfieri, supra note 4, at 632.
SAlfieri, supra note 2, at 2121; see also, Alfieri, supra note 4, at 629.
Alfieri, supra note 2; Alfieri, supra note 4; Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1233 (1992) [hereinafter "Stances']; Anthony V. Alfieri, The Anti-
nomies of Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 659 (1987-88) [hereinafter '!Antinomies'l.
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2139; see also Alfieri, supra note 4, at 652.
'Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 863 (1990).
' For similar criticism, see Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 3, at
959 ("rebellious writers have overlooked the risk clients incur in rejecting technical
lawyer expertise"); Tremblay, Tragic View, supra note 3, at 134, 136 ("The Critical
View literature implies that intrinsic and extrinsic goals [intrinsic goals are "the
storytelling function," extrinsic goals "accomplish ... the results sought when the
client consulted a lawyer"] are not in conflict and may even dovetail ... It tends
not to capture the choice at all, in that it sees client collaboration as instrumen-
tally effective as well as intrinsically effective"); Miller, supra note 3, at 517 ("The
term case theory is noticeably absent from critical writing"). But see, Clark D.
Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text- Towards an
Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1326 (1992) for an
example of cross-examination by a client. In this case, Clark Cunningham per-
ceived "some higher risk of conviction." Id. at 1327.
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er the client as a factor in the workability of such proposals.
After reflection on my own recent legal services practice,
n1
informed by my study of the work done by others in the area of
poverty law, I have come to believe that application of a theory
of poverty law such as the one conceived by the theoretics of
practice movement fails to take into consideration certain real-
ities of poverty law practice;' derives from a singular, roman-
ticized view of the poor; and actually may frustrate client goals
by eviscerating the raison d'etre of the attorney-client relation-
ship.
I. LAWYER INTERPRETATION AND DISPLACEMENT OF CLIENT
STORY
A. Functional Storytelling and Theoretical Assumptions-Why
Clients Tell Us Their Stories
When both Ellen Smith and the Bakers came to our office,
they told their stories, first to our paralegal, and then to me.
In both interviews, the clients told their stories in a narrative
form that was at times chronological and at times disjunct;
that was at times controlled by emotion and at times controlled
by logic; that was at times proud and at times shameful; that
was at times grammatically correct and at times not.
Undoubtedly, each client's whole story, in the client's own
words and with the client's individual nuances, was relevant to
an attempt at holistic knowledge of the client, or an under-
standing of the client's normative context. But neither Ellen
Smith nor the Bakers sought my help because they wanted me
to know and understand every aspect of the normative reality
of their lives. The Bakers came to see me because they did not
want to be homeless. Ellen Smith came to see me because she
did not want her daughter to be hit anymore. This is what
brought these clients into my office. This is what they wanted
from me. This is why they told me their stories.
Any applied theory of poverty law must recognize the
I was the staff attorney and then managing attorney of the Urban Indian
Law Office of Community Legal Services in Phoenix, Arizona from March 1939
until June 1992.
1 See Tremblay, Tragic View, supra note 3, at 133, 140.
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reasons why poverty clients come to see poverty lawyers. 3
The essential assumption of representational narrative scholar-
ship 4 is that poverty lawyers become players in the lives of
their clients in large part so that their clients' stories can be
told." For example, Professor Anthony Alfieri refers to "the
very story [Mrs. Celeste] retained me to tell." 6 Christopher
Gilkerson speaks of a more perfect practice of law "in which
the strategic goal is to enable clients like Mrs. G."7 to tell
their stories and state their legal claims in their own narra-
tives."18
From this basic assumption, various narrative scholars,
either explicitly or implicitly, have critiqued poverty law story-
telling for its failure to actually tell the client's story. 9 Profes-
sor Alfieri asserts that by failing to give voice to the client's
story, infused with normative content (which he defines as the
"meaning and images of the client's social world"20 ), the pover-
ty lawyer silences the client's voice,2' "client integrity is tar-
nished,' and client story is lostF and distorted.24 Professor
Alfieri identifies this displacement of client narrative by attor-
' For a discussion of why poverty clients seek out the services of poverty
lawyers see, Austin Sarat, " . . . The Law Is All Over": Power, Resistance, and the
Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
" By use of the term "representational narrative scholarship," I refer to schol-
arship which addresses the use of narrative in client representation. I do not ad-
dress in this Article the questions raised by Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry
in Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV.
807 (1993). In that article the authors address the merits of narrative as legal
scholarship.
1 In other works Professor Alfieri has recognized the abolition of poverty as
the goal of poverty law. See Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 7.
16 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2130. Mrs. Celeste is the client about whom Pro.
fessor Alfieri writes.
12 This reference is to the client in White, Subordination, supra note 3.
' Gilkerson, supra note 3, at 914.
See, e.g., Afieri supra note 2, at 2107; Alfieri, supra note 4, at 627, 629;
Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law as Language,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Gilkerson, supra note 3; White, Subordination, su-
pra note 3; White, supra note 9.
20 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2111.
21 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2118; Alfieri, supra note 4, at 636-37.
" Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2119 (1991); see also, Alfieri, Stances, supra note 7,
at 1234.
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2119; see also Alfieri, Stances, supra note 7, at
1234.
" Alfieri, Stances, supra note 7, at 1234.
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ney narrative as interpretive violence against the client by the
poverty lawyer.' Christopher Gilkerson echoes this senti-
ment: "In transforming their clients' narratives and substitut-
ing their own compositions, lawyers engage in an act of story
interpretation that may further disempower and silence." '
If theoretics of practice scholars have assumed correctly
the purpose for which poverty lawyers are told clients' stories,
then their critique of traditional poverty law practice is valid.
If poverty clients enter the legal process, and engage us for the
purpose of public storytelling of their struggle, then traditional
poverty law practice-admittedly an ends-oriented endeav-
or- -- is likely to fail them. But if, as I believe, poverty law
clients tell their stories to poverty lawyers for the same simple
reason corporations tell their stories to their lawyers-so that
a certain result can be obtained-then traditional practice
may be not only defensible, but the only appropriate vision for
poverty lawyers.'
By assuming that clients tell their stories to poverty law-
yers so that their stories might be told, theoretics of practice
I Alfier, supra note 2, at 2118 n.36, 2125-26. For a discussion of Professor
Alfieris use of the word "violence" to describe the interpretive stance of poverty
lawyers, see Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work, and Patienc, 43 HASTINGS LJ.
853, 856-859 (1992).
" Gilkerson, supra note 3, at 914.
Professor Paul R. Tremblay argues that the poverty attorney's focus on the
goal in any given case, as opposed to the greater long-term needs of the communi-
ty, is due to the "tendency of care providers to favor the present and identifiable
over the future and unnamed? He terms this tendency as a preference for the
"rescue mission." Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 3, at 950.
2'I do not refer here to problems caused by underfunding, understaffing, elimi-
nation of necessary caseloads through limiting priorities, and a low eligibility cut-
off that under-defines poverty. Rather, I refer to the practice methods used by
poverty attorneys in any given case.
2' John Griffiths has observed, based on empirical research, that:
Clients go to lawyers because it is othenvise impossible to secure a di-
vorce, not because they want to invoke the legal system as a regulatory
and conflict-resolving institution. That the law concerns itself with the
substance of their relationship is an adventitious circumstance for most
divorcing couples, and they generally give the impression of being quite
content to leave as much as possible of this aspect of the process in the
hands of their lawyer. The interviews with divorcing parents confirmed
our observations that on the whole clients are quite satisfied with this
state of affairs; we found little of the alienation that might be expected
on the basis of the "transformation" and 'legalization! literature.
John Griffiths, What Do Dutch Lauwers Actually Do In Divorce Catst?, 20 LAW &
SoclY REv. 135, 155-56 (1986).
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scholars take one of the many relationships in which clients
are involved-the lawyer-client relationship-and value it as
the most important relationship in the client's life. The lawyer-
client relationship becomes the medium through which the
client will be empowered by serving as the catalyst that will
give public voice to the client's story: a story which would oth-
erwise go unheard. But this vision of the poverty client
disempowers the client's voice by over-emphasizing lawyer role
in client storytelling: by suggesting that somehow, if we do not
give voice to the client's story as told by the client in the legal
setting, that voice will be silenced. 0 It assumes that in order
for the client to have an audible voice the lawyer must use
that voice in the advocacy setting, even if complete use of the
client's story might not be the most efficacious strategy in light
of the client's desired result.
More importantly, this assumption-that poverty lawyers
are told clients' stories so that those stories might be given
public voice-leads to reformative suggestions which subordi-
nate the raison d'etre of the attorney-client relationship by de-
emphasizing the legal content of a client's story. We are attor-
neys, not journalists, not politicians, not doctors or ministers.
We are given the privilege of hearing clients' stories because
we can try to turn those stories into client-dictated legal re-
sults, in spite of economic circumstance.
In forging any theory of poverty law, we cannot forget the
functional reason why we are chosen to hear a client's story,
and why we are asked to re-tell that client's story. To think
that we have the privilege of hearing clients' stories for a
greater purpose than to achieve legal results, and therefore
that we become caretakers of or conduits for uninterpreted and
unabridged client story, aggrandizes and yet eviscerates the
role of the poverty lawyer in the life of the poverty law client.
" Indeed, Robert Dinerstein has recognized, "The theoretics movement must
also avoid its own form of essentialism in which poor clients are seen as all-pow-
erful individuals awaiting only their lawyers' assistance to unleash their potency."
Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
971 (1992).
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B. The Essence of Legal Paradigm
Undeniably, poverty lawyers engage in the process of im-
posing legal paradigms on their clients' stories.?' The real
question is not whether this process occurs, but whether it
signifies subconscious application of case theory' to and justi-
fied adaptation and translation of the client's story,' or
whether this process wreaks interpretive violence or is sup-
pressive,' tragicm or domineering a
I begin my analysis here with the assumption, as dis-
cussed above, that poverty clients come to see poverty lawyers
to obtain certain results. If this is why they come to see us,
then we have a responsibility to see that their story is used to
realize the legal goal that they cannot or do not want to accom-
plish without our assistance. How, then, are we to do what we
are asked to do?
31 Professor Alfieri suggests that the poverty lawyer, if asked, would deem his
interpretation of client story neutral. Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2121; Alfieri, supra
note 4, at 630. I believe that most poverty lawyers probably recognize that their
interpretation of client story is not neutral, but rather is based on application of
legal construct to story.
* Binny Miller has criticized that "in the rush to embrace client voice, these
[critical and client-centered] scholars have virtually ignored the critical role that
case theory can play in linking client stories to the narratives that lawyers tell on
behalf of clients." M filler, supra note 3, at 487. She defines case theory as "a lens
for shaping reality, in light of the law, to explain the facts, relationships, and
circumstances of the client and other parties in the way that can best achieve the
clients goals." Miller, supra note 3, at 487.
31 Cunningham, supra note 10. See also, Cunningham, supra note 19, at 2483,
2490-91 (The translator should not silence the speaker but rather seek to enhance
the speaker's voice by adding her own.).
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2118.
' Alfieri, supra note 4.
s Alfieri, Stances, supra note 7, at 1234, interpreting James B. White, Transla-
tion as a Mode of Thought, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1388 (1992).
' Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 7, at 691-92; White, supra note 9; Carl J.
Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened, We Only Care About What Is
Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 SOC. PROBS. 699 (1979).
Other authors have viewed the poverty attorney's tendency toward traditional
practice as motivated by caring for the immediate good of the individual client
over the good produced by larger, socio-political concerns. See Tremblay, Rebellious
Lawyering, supra note 3, at 967-68; see also James F. Smurl, Eligibility for Legal
Aid, Whom To Help When Unable to Help All, 12 IND. L. RMV. 519, 530-31 (1979).
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1. Utilitarian Control of Story
Professor Alfieri, one of the only theoretics of practice
scholars to make relational suggestions designed to reach the
goals enunciated by this movement, suggests that poverty
lawyers should engage in reconstructive practices to end the
silencing and displacement of client narrative.' These recon-
structive practices include: play ("the deliberate act of shifting
the dominant-dependent hierarchy of the lawyer-client rela-
tion,"9 or the "shifting of power" to the client);" metaphor
(forcing fuller understanding and telling of client story);41 col-
laboration ("integration of client-spoken narratives into the
public storytelling of advocacy");42 redescription ("retelling
client story consonant with the voices of client narratives"),43
and "emplacement" of the client in problem resolution through
direct client participation (such as direct client/caseworker
negotiation)." Each of these reconstructive practices envisions
greater client control over the dispute resolution process. The
stated goal of such practices is to "overturn lawyer narrative
and install a self-proclaimed client narrative."5
The ideological underpinning of Professor Alfieri's vision of
reconstructive practice, indeed of the whole theoretics of prac-
tice movement, is the notion that as control over client story in
the legal setting is taken away from the poverty attorney, it is
given back to the client. This view, however, fails to distin-
guish between utilitarian control, or the use of story to achieve
a legal goal, and the Musion of control that may accompany
the right to be heard.46
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2119 ("'The intent of this Essay is to understand
and rectify the loss of client narratives in lawyer storytelling.").
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2136. This sort of practice is referred to as role
modification as well as "play" in Alfieri, supra note 4, at 635, 646-47.
4 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2137.
, Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2138-39.
Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2140; see also Alfieri, supra note 4, at 635.
Alfier, supra note 2, at 2141.
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2130, 2145.
Alfieri, supra note 4, at 632.
By choosing the word "utilitarian" here, I do not mean to imply economic
success at all costs. Rather, I refer to the utilitarianism of reaching an end envi-
sioned after consideration of economics, emotions, relationships, self-image and the
like. Use of story becomes utilitarian only when these factors have been considered
[Vol. 61:889
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Ellen Smith and the Bakers, like most other poverty law
clients, faced problems which, with or without my involvement,
were likely to be resolved by use and application of the law. By
the time both clients came to my office, it was clear that the
issues would not be resolved by the parties without resort to
some sort of tribunal." The mortgagee in the Bakers' case
was threatening judicial foreclosure. Ellen and her former
husband could not amicably agree to a change in her former
husband's behavior or to a change in custody. Thus, the legal
resolution of their cases unavoidably would involve placing
legal construct on the stories they told: a construct which
would likely dictate the result they would obtain from the legal
system.
Since resolution of any legal issue, for a poverty client or
otherwise, involves placing legal construct on the client's story,
the party that is allowed to place legal construct on the client's
story becomes the party vested with utilitarian control of that
story. The question then becomes this: If the poverty attorney
does not place legal construct on the client's story, does the
power over this role default to the client or to someone else?
Based on studies of non-lawyer, small claims courts by
William M. O'Barr and John M. Conley,49 Lucie White has
observed:
Litigants who use a relational framework [which emphasizes status
and relationship in story rather than rules and laws] do poorly in
court because the logic of their stories clashes with the rule-breach-
injury logic in which judges have learned to conceptualize legal
in determining client goals. See infra part IL
I I use the term "tribunal" to encompass all legal decisionmakers, including
mediators, arbitrators, administrative judges, and state and federal judges.
Clark Cunningham has observed, "The lawyer cannot change the client!s raw
memories of the experience but can and indeed must alter the client's knowledge
of 'what happened' by reconstituting that experience into a different symbolic
form." Cunninghan supra note 19, at 2482-83. Robert Dinerstein has acknowl-
edged that, "Clients need lawyers not only to hear their stories, but also to help
them shape those stories to make them as effective as possible within the existing
legal milieu, or to collaborate with them to devise the best means to transform it.
Put differently, lawyers and clients must of necessity look at client stories in an
at least somewhat instrumental manner." Dinerstein, supra note 30, at 985.
John Ml. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Rules Versus Relationships In Small
Claims Disputes, CONFLICT TALK 178 (Grimshaw ed., 1990); William IL O"Baxr &
John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claim Court
Narratives, 19 LAW & S0C'Y REV. 661 (1985).
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claims.... Thus, on the level of story as well as sentence, powerless
speakers tend to use speech strategies that increase their
disempowerment. °
In other words, disempowered litigants, such as the poor, can-
not place legal construct on their own stories, and so if they
are unrepresented the judge performs this task.
The control vested in the client under the reconstructive
practices suggested by Professor. Alfieri does not implicate
utilitarian control of story. Neither "shifting the dominant-
dependent hierarchy of the lawyer-client relation,""' nor fuller
telling of client story, 2 nor "integration of client-spoken nar-
ratives into the public storytelling of advocacy,"M nor direct
client participation in the dispute resolution process" involves
placing legal construct on the client's story. Thus, under these
reconstructive practices, the role of imposing legal construct is
left unassigned.
If the poverty lawyer does not take an interpretive editori-
al role in the presentation of the client's story through the
imposition of legal construct upon it, utilitarian control over
the story is forfeited to other entities, such as the tribunal or
the opposing attorney, neither of whom are as closely affiliated
with the client's interests as the poverty attorney. Although it
may be "beyond the lawyer's epistemological and interpretive
reach"55 to fully identify with the client's normative reality,
the poverty lawyer certainly is more likely to impose a client-
friendly legal construct on the client's story than an unaffiliat-
ed tribunal or adversary-affiliated counsel.
Furthermore, failure to impose a legal paradigm can lead
to the presentation of an obtuse case to the tribunal. This
omission can de-emphasize important elements of a case
through juxtaposition of legally relevant information with
holistically relevant, but legally irrelevant, information about
' White, Subordination, supra note 3, at 17. For observations of the
powerlessness of pro se litigants in Baltimore's landlord-tenant courts, see Bezdek,
supra note 4, at 583-90.
6 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2136.
Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2138-39.
Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2140.
Professor Alfieri calls this practice "emplacement." Alfieri, supra note 2, at
2145.
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2111.
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the client." Such an approach can consume more of the
court's time than an already focused case.' In essence, failure
to impose legal paradigm can compromise the client's legal
goals in the name of complete presentation of the client to the
tribunal.'
I do not suggest here that placing legal construct is a neu-
tral practice. Undoubtedly, traditional legal interpretation
leads many poverty lawyers to reject socially contextualized
legal arguments without giving them enough consideration.
For example, in my own practice I failed to use in advocacy the
fact that my client, a Navajo, thought that he had been evicted
when his landlord told him, "If you don't like my rules, you can
leave." Constrained by my narrow and traditional interpreta-
tion of the word "evicted," I concluded that he was liable for
the balance of the rent owed on his apartment because he had
abandoned the apartment before termination of his lease. Had
I been willing to consider the usability of my client's interpre-
tations in advocacy, I might have been able to handle the case
in a way that would have been more beneficial to my client
and would have validated his understanding of the forces
working in his world. 9 On the other hand, it is likely that
I John At Conley and Wiliam B1. O'Barr label these two storytelling style3
"relational" and "rule oriented" in their essay Rules Versus Relationships in Small
Claims Disputes:
A relational account emphasizes status and relationships, and is orga-
nized around the litigants efforts to introduce these issues into the trial.
A rule oriented account emphasizes rules and laws, and is tightly
structured around these issues.... Rule-oriented accounts mesh better
with the logic of the law and the courts.... [They] concentrate on the
issues that the court is likely to deem relevant to the case.. .. By con-
trast, relational accounts are filled with background details that are pre-
sumably relevant to the litigant, but not necessarily the court, and em-
phasize the complex web of relationships between the litigants rather
than legal rules or formal contracts.
Conley & OBarr, supra note 49, at 178-79.
See Julie Shapiro, Snake Pits and Unseen Actors: Constitutional Liability for
Indirect Harm, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 883, 887 (1994) ("Lawyers routinely transform
multi-dimensional client stories into focused narratives that can be told in courL").
' See Alfieri, Stances, supra note 7, at 1239, interpreting Cunningham, oupra
note 10, at 1362 (communicating ftill client story may "interfere" with "effective"
representation).
" For example, use of this misinterpretation by my client of what it meant to
be evicted could have allowed my client to tell the court about prejudiced or
mean-spirited behavior by the landlord leading up to the "eviction." This could
have both given voice to my client's feelings at facing this type of behavior and
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even had I considered and presented this argument, it might
have failed in the face of the court's technical definition of
"eviction."
Professor Alfieri argues that the lawyer's pre-understand-
ing of the client's world leads to unwarrantedly narrow use of
client struggle and context in the legal setting." This view
suggests that if poverty lawyers could just understand the
normative aspects of their clients' lives, they would be able to
use these aspects in dispute resolution. But as the eviction
story suggests, the real challenge, even for poverty lawyers
who hear and understand their clients' struggles, is to be able
to suspend their pre-understanding of the traditional bound-
aries of rules of law when imposing legal paradigms on their
clients' stories. In other words, an unwarrantably narrow un-
derstanding of the boundaries of law, not of the client's world,
may be the culprit.6
Professor Alfieri also suggests that poverty lawyers "pre-
suppose that narratives of client struggle are unusable in advo-
cacy." 2 But the act of placing legal construct on a client's sto-
ry demands productive, selective use of narratives of client
struggle.'s Thus poverty lawyers must pre-suppose that not
all narratives of the client's struggles are productive toward
obtaining the client's legal goal, and must choose what dis-
course of struggle must be omitted from the client's story as
told in the legal setting. This choice may not always be exer-
cised perfectly. For example, the story which Professor Alfieri
tells to demonstrate that he, like all poverty lawyers, assumed
that his client's struggle was not usable in advocacy evidences
to my mind a poor choice of what narrative of struggle is us-
able rather than an out-of-hand dismissal of the usability of
helped to explain why he thought he had been evicted.
" Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2123.
6' See Hosticka, supra note 37, at 609, for a discussion of poverty attorneys'
failure to consider legal courses of action.
Alferi, supra note 2, at 2123; see also Alfieri, supra note 4, at 644.
For an example of aspects of story's relation to desired result see, William
N. Eskridge, Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN L. REV. 607 (1994). In this article Pro-
fessor Eskridge tells a fuller story of gays in the military. But he does not simply
retell the story. He demonstrates why pieces of that story are productive and
relevant to contesting the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy. This connection
between story and its relevance is the connection often missing in theoretics of
practice literature.
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struggle in telling the client's story." That this choice leads to
the omission of some discourse of struggle, and is not always
exercised perfectly, must not lead to the conclusion that pover-
ty attorneys assume that all narratives of client struggle are
unusable in advocacy.
Placing legal construct on a story may involve adaptive in-
terpretive stances appropriate to the forum, the judge, the
opponent, the opposing counsel and a host of other factors
which may shift and change during the course of a case. It may
involve interpretive stances objectionable to the lawyer. It may
involve interpretation and re-interpretation, adaptation and re-
adaptation.
These interpretive stances are not falsification of the
client's normative reality,' but facilitation of client story to-
ward client goal.' This is the very same navigational inter-
pretation performed by all lawyers on all clients' stories.67 It
empowers client narrative by selectively relating interpreted
client narrative appropriate to serving the purpose for which
the story is told in the first place It is the professional act of
constructing out of the bricks and mortar that are our laws a
bridge between the client's story and the client's goals.' It is
"Professor Alfieri asserts that most poverty lawyers would view as unusable
in advocacy information regarding his clients frustrations and hardship3 from
dealing with her social security caseworker. Alfieri, supra note 4, at 643. As proof
of this, he explains how he omitted this discourse of struggle from his dtory of the
client's legal issues, forcing the client to raise this narrative of atruggle herself
before the administrative law judge. Alfier, supra note 4, at 643. I personally do
not know many poverty lawyers who would exclude this discourse of rewistanoa in
their rendition of this client's story. I am sure there are some poverty attorneys,
including myselt who would even provide Mrs. V. with the space to make her
entire statement without interruption in the form of questions. For a similar criti-
cism see Iller, supra note 3, at 528.
Alfier, supra note 2, at 211L
Indeed, Clark Cunningham has observed that the 'change in meaning [r-
volved in lawyer translation of client story] need not result in 'misrepresentation,
if... the lawyer engages both the client and the law-speaking other party in
dialogue that enable each to expand what they know so as to meet on common
ground." Cunningham, supra note 19, at 249L
61 For a similar description using the word "translation! instead of navigation
see Cunningham, supra note 19, at 2491; Cunningham, supra note 33, at 1299-
1300 ("Translation offers both an image of the constraints upon a lawyer's ability
to represent fully his client's story and a model for recognizing and managing the
inevitable changes in meaning in a way that may empower rather than subjugate
the client).
" Clark Cunningham has observed that 'the lawyer must identify and cros3
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the only means to assure that utilitarian control of story re-
mains with the client.
Even when poverty lawyers do expand and reconsider
their presuppositions regarding the limits of legal argument
they still must accept and reject facts and legal arguments as
they impose legal paradigm on the client's story and begin the
process of distilling client story toward client goal. For exam-
ple, it was my job as the Bakers' lawyer to at least consider
the impact of domestic violence and alcohol abuse on their
case, and whether any information about these issues belonged
in the legal content of their mortgage story. My first consider-
ation had to be a recognition of the Bakers' domestic situa-
tion.69 My next consideration had to be whether a judge or
jury would care if one of the reasons the Bakers had defaulted
on their mortgage payments might have been that alcoholism
and abuse had kept the Bakers from earning a large enough
income to make the payments. I most certainly had to consider
whether information about the Bakers' domestic situation, if
included in the legal content of their story, would most likely
hurt or help the outcome they desired (i.e., not to be kicked out
of their house with no money to find replacement housing).
Finally, I had to consider whether the Bakers wished to make
public this aspect of their lives.
The act of applying legal construct to a client's story must
take into consideration social context, systemic limits on the
usability of social context, and the costs of using social context
the gap between what the client says and what can be said in the language of
the law." Cunningham, supra note 19, at 2491. He has also observed that "Ibjy
speaking through a translator, one can be heard and understood in places where
otherwise one is mute." Cunningham, supra note 10, at 1299.
" Recognition of circumstances like those facing these clients is not always
easy. Early in my representation of them, the Bakers did not give any indication
of the alcoholism or domestic violence affecting their lives, and I did not begin my
relationship with them assuming their marriage involved domestic violence and
alcoholism. I only discovered these problems when Mr. Baker was arrested during
a domestic dispute and Mrs. Baker called me to ask if I could help Mr. Baker. I
suppose the most any attorney can do is hope to create a space where it is safe
for the client to reveal this sort of embarrassing information. Yet, it may not be
possible for the attorney to do this in cases such as the Bakers', where I met with
both the husband and wife together and they were both my clients. Also, needless
to say, it is common for people who are alcoholics or drug addicts to be in denial.
No amount of "safety" can encourage disclosure of something the client does not
even recognize.
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in argument. There are undeniable limits on the extent to
which socially contextualized argument can impact outcome,
and public airing of social context is not without its costs.
Thus, the poverty attorney who has broadened his or her hori-
zon and considered non-traditional facts and legal arguments
may still reject the usability of aspects of the client's story or
the attainability of aspects of the client's goal.
That the attorney performs this final act of determining
the boundaries of the story to be presented in advocacy should
not necessarily lead to an indictment of the poverty attorney.
It is not in the client's best interest for the poverty lawyer to
completely abandon her experientially derived knowledge and
expertise and become merely a conduit for the telling of the
client's story by defaulting to the client's definitions of relevan-
cy. The act of having considered nontraditional elements of the
client's story and having applied broadly considered legal para-
digms to the client's story should be the goal of reconstructive
practice, not necessarily the reflexive use of these elements of
story in advocacy.
If clients, poverty-stricken and otherwise, were able to
place legal construct on their own stories they would not need
attorneys, except perhaps as procedural guides. 0 Interpretive
selection and omission of pieces of a client's story is the appli-
cation of attorney expertise to the client's story. To seek to im-
pose this role on the client abdicates the responsibility of the
poverty lawyer and disregards the reasons why the client has
come to the poverty lawyer in the first place.
It is my belief that the very job of the poverty lawyer, or
for that matter any lawyer, is to take utilitarian control of a
client's story toward achieving the client's legal goal. Failure to
do so gives the client only illusory control, turns utilitarian
control over to entities not aligned with the client, and eviscer-
ates the lawyer's paramount role in the client's life.
"0 See White, Mobilization of the Margin, supra note 3, at 542-43 (*The talk
and ritual of litigation constitute a discourse and a culture that are foreign to
most poor people. Poor people obviously do not speak in the same dialect that
lawyers, judges, and elite business people use.").
1995]
BROOKLYN LAW.REVIEW
2. Ownership of Story
What is left to the client if, by imposing legal construct,
the poverty lawyer exercises control over the form and sub-
stance of the client's story in the legal setting? Professor Alfieri
suggests that what takes place when, through the imposition
of legal construct, lawyer narrative displaces client narrative is
no less than a de facto transfer of absolute ownership of the
client's story from the client to the lawyer: "[Tihe cost[s of
poverty law advocacy are] ... paid for by the lawyer's pur-
chase of the client's story, and with it, her voice and narra-
tive."7 ' But this vision treats story as if it were a thing or ob-
ject capable only of singular placement.
The notion of clients' stories as things to be placed with
either client or lawyer fails to acknowledge the multifaceted
role of any given story. The lives of most poverty clients, like
those of all clients, are rich with complex relationships and
alliances. As with all individuals, poverty law clients tell their
stories in different settings for different reasons. They may tell
their stories to a family member for emotional support; to oth-
ers in the same position for political reasons; to their religious
leaders for guidance, strength or forgiveness; to their children
as lessons; to their employers to justify absences. In each set-
ting, the client may distill the story in furtherance of the pur-
pose for which the story is being told.7" Over time, the client's
own understanding of his or her story may change and trans-
form.7
3
In the legal setting, the story poverty lawyers construct is
a distillation of legal content in furtherance of the legal pur-
"' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2146. In a later article he speaks of the client's
surrender of her voice and story in exchange for legal aid. Alfieri, supra note 4, at
632.
1 In fact, the story that we hear from clients may already be a client-based,
legal distillation of client story. For a study of how clients perceive their own legal
problems, see Sarat, supra note 13, at 365-374. We should not believe that we
hear the same client story that, for example, the client's spouse or minister might
hear. Professor Gerald Lopez articulates various stories that could be told in vari-
ous settings around the same problem. Lopez, supra note 3.
"' See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEo. L.J. 2475, 2475
(1993) ("The story told by a battered woman on one day may be different two
days later, after she has separated from the batterer.").
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pose. Does this act implicate a transfer of ownership of story
from client to lawyer? I do not believe so.
The paper out of which we cut our narrative of a client's
story is, for lack of a better analogy, not the original manu-
script, but a photocopy. We are asked to take our copy and cut
and paste until the story can be used to achieve the client's
legal goal. In this construct, original client story, consisting of
normative, moral, religious, political, social and legal content,
is never transferred to the poverty attorney. The ownership of
story is unaffected. Ownership is left intact and in the client's
control for selective use in other settings. The story can be re-
told, adapted, modified or concealed in all private and public
aspects of the client's life by the client, unencumbered and
uncontrolled by the attorney.
That client story remains intact and within the client's
control, even when client narrative is displaced in the legal
setting by lawyer narrative, is demonstrated by Professor
Alfieri's description of Mrs. Celeste's use of aspects of her own
story "in welfare and utility company offices, foster parent
meetings, and administrative hearings,"74 and in her sharing
of a "fuller story of her struggle" in her foster care meetings. 5
Undoubtedly, these were not the only arenas in which Mrs.
Celeste told her story. 6
Lucie White recommends this use of story, outside of liti-
gation over the same story, as a parallel space, "in the shadow
of welfare litigation," where "clients could speak their own
stories of suffering, accountability and change, free from the
technical and strategic constraints imposed by the court-
room." Clearly, this parallel space continues to exist despite
the narrative interpretation and imposition of legal construct
7' Alfier, supra note 2, at 213L
Alfier, supra note 2, at 2144.
Similarly, by publishing Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Dr. Martin Luthar
King, Jr. proved that he retained ownership of the story of his civil disobedience
and arrest in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963, despite the stories told by his law-
yers and a juridical record fixing in history a judicial determination that he had
committed a crime. Compare Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham
Jail, in WHY WE CAN' WAIT 77 (1963) with Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388
U.S. 307 (1967). See also David Luban, Difference Made Legal. The Court and Dr.
King, 87 MICEL L. REV. 2152 (1989) (contrasting the Court's decision in Walker
with Letter from a Birmingham Jail).
" White, Mobilization on the fargins, supra note 3, at 546.
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performed by the poverty attorney. Thus, the poverty attorney
does not have the omnipotence to appropriate or lose client
story, only the power to lose the client's case. 8
3. Images of Dependence and Inferiority in Story
In poverty practice the majority of my clients told stories
that often made me wonder how human beings could live with
themselves while engaging in a course of conduct that involved
such victimization of others. I handled countless cases for stu-
dents who had been promised and had paid for an education by
private vocational schools that closed or severely failed to edu-
cate them. I handled countless cases of clients who traded in
their cars for new ones that didn't make it through the first
week of ownership. I repeatedly faced landlords who kept secu-
rity deposits, failed to maintain safe premises, and pursued my
clients with vindictiveness. In these, and other types of cases,
the clients I represented were very different from each other.
Collectively and individually they portrayed every opposing
clich6 used to describe "the poor": they were weak, they were
strong, they were hard-working, they were lazy, they were
strongly devoted to their families, they didn't care about their
families, they were addicted to drugs and alcohol, they ab-
stained from the use of drugs and alcohol, they were educated,
they were uneducated. The one way in which they were all
similar was that the stories they told-the stories which had
brought them to my office for help-usually contained elements
of dependence and victimization. I believed then, and still
believe, that a poverty lawyer must not hide aspects of depen-
dence and victimization in a client's story when that victimiza-
tion or dependence is an integral part of explaining "what hap-
pened."
Theoretics of practice scholars criticize images of depen-
dency used in poverty law advocacy for presenting clients as
inferior, dehumanized objects. Once again, Professor Alfieri
makes the most vehement criticism. To Professor Alfieri, imag-
es of dependency in lawyer narrative of a client's story position
the client as inferior: "an object acted upon but incapable of
", For a discussion of the permanent inscription of story in published judicial
opinions, see generally Luban, supra note 76.
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action."79 But dependency is not always synonymous with in-
feriority or even with marginalization. The meaning of depen-
dence can range from the positive dependence of relying on
others to help us when we do not know how, to a debilitating
lack of ability to handle any aspect of our lives, including ev-
erything in between. Some form of dependence likely plays a
part in the stories told by clients embroiled in legal disputes.
A client (or attorney for that matter) who is divorced and
granted visitation of his or her children depends in a very real
way on the good faith of the other parent in facilitating visita-
tion. A welfare recipient depends all too often on the good
graces of welfare office workers to continue receiving benefits
trouble-free. 0 Tenants depend on the willingness of their
landlords to comply with housing codes. People like me who
don't know anything about cars depend on mechanics to tell us
the truth about the problem and to repair only what is wrong.
Various colleagues with whom I shared the ideas in this
Article insisted that the dependence I experience when I deal
with, for example, an auto mechanic, differs somehow from the
dependence my clients experience when they encounter the
same mechanic. The essence of this view is that I am better
able to manage unfamiliar situations because of my education,
because of my income level, because I am white: essentially
because of all of the things that would not categorize me as a
minority or as disadvantaged. The converse conclusion is that
in some ways my dependence on a mechanic resembles my
clients' dependence because I am a woman. These assumptions
lead inexorably to the conclusion that because poverty clients
are always powerless, they are always dependent, and that
because it is their poverty-and possibly their minority sta-
tus-that makes them necessarily dependent, that dependency
inexorably equates with inferiority.
The story conclusion drawn from these observations is that
the dependency I experience is not infused with inferiority,
while the dependency experienced by my client is. Hence the
dependency in my client's story should somehow be omitted
from tribunal storytelling, while my own dependence, should I
' Alfier , supra note 2, at 2128; see also, Afieri cupra note 4, at 625.
' This condition is recognized in White, Mobilization on the Margin, supra
note 3.
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need to resort to a tribunal, or even the inferior negotiating
capabilities of a small business dealing with a large corpora-
tion, can be used in tribunal storytelling without connoting
inferiority.81
I believe that drawing storytelling conclusions based on
this presumed power position of poverty clients is misguided. I
do not believe that individuals or groups of individuals have a
single level of powerfulness that places them in the same posi-
tion of power in every encounter they have. I cannot claim to
be better positioned to handle an auto mechanic than my client
who is an auto mechanic simply because I am educated and
white. I can claim to be in a better position than my client in
dealing with a landlord who has unlawfully kept my security
deposit because I know that the law requires return of the
security deposit and I can file a lawsuit without paying for an
attorney. Essentially, I do not believe that decisions whether to
include images of dependency in storytelling can or should be
based on the economic circumstance, race, gender, or national
origin of the client.
That all of us, poverty clients and poverty lawyers alike,
are dependent in certain circumstances does not suggest a
wholly dependent or inferior existence. By the time most pov-
erty law clients see a lawyer they have been forced into a de-
pendent position by the very entity whose power they seek to
challenge through the lawyer." They have been abused by a
spouse, treated unfairly by a car dealership or their employer
or the government, or forced to live in squalid conditions. The
situational dependence that inevitably accompanies predica-
ments such as these is real. Any version of the client's story
which includes this dependence is not the result of a false
imprimatur of dependence, but acknowledgment of dependence
that already exists. Similarly, describing the client as having
been acted upon where this is the case is not interpretive vio-
lence, but interpretive honesty.' Mrs. Celeste, the client
about whom Professor Alfieri writes, was "[als a foster par-
81 See generally Alfieri, supra note 2; Alfieri, supra note 4, at 629.
" See Hosticka, supra note 37, at 602.
Professor Alfieri speaks in several articles about lawyers portraying their
poverty clients as objects being "acted upon." See Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2128-29;
Alfieri, supra note 4, at 631.
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ent... trained, licensed, and inspected"' and "[als a food
stamp recipient... certified, budgeted, and issued benefits."
The Bakers were acted upon by their mortgagee. Ellen Smith
was dependent on her ex-husband's good faith in complying
with visitation. A story inclusive of these facts does not have to
suggest that this dependence permeates all aspects of the
client's life.
A paradigmatic interpretation of the client's story which
recognizes that this limited and situational dependence exists
cannot by itself "conjure... the image of the client as a de-
pendent and inferior object.' In other words, an inferior im-
age of the client is not a necessary corollary to recognizing that
some level of situational dependence exists in the story the
client has been a part of. To tell their stories as if Mrs. Celeste
or John and Jane Baker were not dependent and acted upon in
their particular situations would be to falsify their stories.
That a client is taken advantage of by a car dealer, beaten by a
spouse, evicted by a landlord, caused injury by another party,
defrauded, licensed, unlicensed, issued an order to pay
overpayments, or recruited to a fraudulent vocational school
does not suggest inferiority, but merely the dependence that
can accompany being victimized. It is not possible to tell these
stories without the element of dependence. More importantly,
it may not be wise for us, as lawyers, to tell these stories ab-
sent the elements of dependence and victimization, since these
factors play a role in explaining the equities of a case.
The images of dependency that often accompany a poverty
client's story recount one aspect of one relationship in the
client's life in which the client has lost, or perhaps never had,
equal power. These images of dependency accurately reflect
dependency arising from the situation in which the client finds
himself or herself. These images are essential to productive
and honest advocacy. Recognition that these uneven circum-
stances exist in the client's life does not necessitate creating an
image of complete social dependence and inferiority. Further-
more, acknowledgement of situational dependency is not inher-
ently more embarrassing or disempowering to a poverty client
Alferi, supra note 2, at 2128.
SAlfier, supra note 2, at 2128.
= Contra, Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2121; Alfieri, supra note 4, at 629.
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than it would be to a wealthier client who has been taken
advantage of or victimized. Most importantly, these reality-
based images of dependency do not require that the poverty
lawyer conjure up or convey the image of a fully dependent or
inferior being, but of a dependent circumstance in the multi-
faceted and multi-positioned life of the client. In the end, the
judge, jury or adjudicator may, because of personal biases,
view the presented situational dependence in a manner that is
denigrating to the client's personhood. But this risk cannot
keep the poverty lawyer from describing situational depen-
dence that is an integral part of the client's story. We must be
certain we are not conjuring irrelevant images of inferiority
and dependence, but we cannot omit relevant facts for fear
that through those facts, others will conclude that our clients
are inferior.
The stories clients tell us usually contain aspects of both
dependence and independence, competence and incompetence,
superiority and inferiority. These elements of story necessarily
comprise part of the lawyer-narrated whole and the client-
narrated whole. They need not merely appear in oppositional
pairings caused by competing lawyer and client narrative im-
ages,87 with lawyer-told narrative using only the negative as-
pects of these oppositional pairings. Dependence and incom-
petence sometimes must appear in narrative images because
they are present in the life and incident being described, and
because they are almost always relevant to legal relief. A client
who has been forced into a dependent position by an unfair
opponent is much more likely to win the sympathies of the
tribunal than one who presents a sanitized story that fails to
fully convey the impact the opponent has had on the client's
life.
If lawyer incorporation of real dependency into lawyer
narrative is not the cause of imaging and portraying the client
as a dependent and inferior object, then what is? Undoubtedly
some poverty law attorneys view, treat and portray their cli-
ents as "dependent and inferior object[s]."' But this problem
does not emanate from a legal services paradigm that recogniz-
es situational dependence. Rather, the stigmatized vision of a
" Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2136.
Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2136.
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dependent and inferior poverty client is rooted in negative
generalizations about the poor, undoubtedly exacerbated by
burnout and case load: a problem separate and apart from rec-
ognition of the existence of situational dependence.'
The poverty lawyer able to avoid negative generalization is
unlikely to treat her clients as dependent and inferior objects
and can see dependence where it actually exists in a client's
story and life. Without generalization, the poverty lawyer is
likely to find some clients who, despite the elements of depen-
dency and being acted upon in their stories, are powerful and
independent. On the other hand, there will be clients who are
dependent on drugs or alcohol, who engage in criminal behav-
ior, or who abuse their spouse or children. While these client
traits may lead the poverty lawyer to a subtextual conclusion
that a client is dependent or inferior, this conclusion is distinct
from the dependency found in the story of the client's legal
problem.
The dependency found in a client's story should not be
rejected simply because it is a form of dependency. Inferiority
is not a necessary companion to stories with elements of de-
pendence, and failure to recognize and use elements of depen-
dence in a client's story is more likely to lead to falsification of
the client's story than lawyer narrative of the client's story. We
are all dependent when we are victimized. The dependence
that Professor Alfieri speaks of, the dependence synonymous
with inferiority, is not the same as the elements of dependency
found in a client's story. Rejection of the dependence synony-
mous with inferiority does not mandate rejection or ignorance
of the real dependence that may exist in a client's story.
Poor or not, we are all forced into dependent roles at
times. Recognizing this situational dependency, and using it in
advocacy on behalf of a client, cannot by itself marginalize and
subordinate the client unless recognition of dependency is also
accompanied by negative generalization and failure to recog-
nize the client as an individual.
' For a critique of poverty lawyering that focuses on the legal services Milieu,
rather than poverty attorneys themselves, see Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering,
supra note 3, at 950. See also Dinerstein, supra note 30, at 983.
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4. Normative Content of Story: When Bad Things Happen
to Bad People 0
Some scholars who suggest using client-told story instead
of lawyer distillation of the client's story in advocacy demon-
strate this point by telling the stories of poverty clients whose
full stories contain hegemonically valued normative content,
such as love of family and children,9 or respect for religion.92
In Reconstructive Poverty Law, Professor Alfieri speaks
extensively of the virtuous elements of his client's story that he
omitted in his re-telling of her story-the elements of Dignity,
Caring, Community and Rights." The stories of the clients
about whom he has written in other articles all contain similar
virtuous elements.94 Similarly, in Notes on the Hearing of
Mrs. G.,95 Lucie White examines whether her lawyering si-
lenced her client's story, which valued the purchase of church
shoes as a necessity of life.96
Although Professor Alfieri disclaims an essentialist por-
trait of poverty client story,97 he uses Mrs. Celeste's story to
demonstrate that lawyer-told client story, by its very interpre-
tive nature, is antithetical to client story imbued with norma-
tive meaning and values such as "selfhood, family, community,
love and work."98 In essence, he suggests that virtuous or pos-
This is a word play on HAROLD S. KUSHNER, WHEN BAD THINGs HAPPEN TO
GOOD PEOPLE (1981).
See generally Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2107; Alfieri, supra note 4, at 652.
See generally White, Subordination, supra note 3. But see Dinerstein, oupra
note 30 (reflecting on a case in which the client may have had psychiatric prob-
lems).
Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2114-18.
,Professor Alfieri has written about a two-year-old client with sickle-cell ane-
mia who was excluded from the WIC nutrition program in Alfieri, Antinomies, su-
pra note 7, at 693, and a young mother in need of diapers and formula for her
baby. Alfieri, supra note 4.
" See generally White, Subordination, supra note 3.
But see generally Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking 'Welfare Dependency'
from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1974-75, 1999-2000 (1993), in which
Professor White discusses the need for liberal scholars to consider all welfare re-
cipients, even those who conform to the lazy, able-bodied poor image of conserva-
tive discourse, in discussions of welfare policy.
" Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2122. But see Alfieri, supra note 4, at 632 ("Theso
strategies affirm a client world infused with the values of autonomy, community,
and participation. Such values are always immanent.").
" Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2119; see also Alfieri, supra note 4, at 634, in which
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itive images of these values and elements are necessarily pres-
ent in, and then omitted by lawyer distillation of client sto-
ry
99
By choosing to write about Mrs. Celeste, Professor Alfieri
is able to show how, in her case, his traditional interpretive
practice forced omission of essential elements of his client's
struggle as a human being. He then extrapolates from his
omission a criticism of traditional poverty law practice in gen-
eral for its failure to present story in the course of advocacy
that is imbued with normative content. The subliminal mes-
sage is clear. Traditional advocacy fails to convey a holistic
image of the client, favoring instead presentation of a limited
glimpse of the client's reality, and thereby ignoring the virtu-
ous and righteous aspects of a client's story.
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have warned that '[i]f
the story is being used as the basis for recommending policy
changes, it should be typical of the experiences of those affect-
ed by the policy."00 One of the major defects with a poverty
law theory that advocates as standard practice the telling of
clients' stories imbued with normative content is its reliance on
a romanticized and biblically based' generalization of the
poor that fails to recognize the normative, moral, ethical and
legal differences in individual client's stories." Not all pover-
ty clients can tell stories like Mrs. Celeste's" imbued with
Professor Alfieri speaks of his client's "daily acts of autonomy and community."
I Alfier, supra note 2, at 211-13. Peter Margulies recognizes the homogeneous
perception of descriptively similar groups in The Mother with Poor Judgment, 88
NW. U. L. REV. 695, 699, 714-15. The differences among the 'welfare poor" are
explored in Sarat, supra note 13, at 348; see also, Lopez, cupra note 3, at 1716
("Mhe subordinated, for all their apparent solidarity in certain struggles, are not
in any sense homogeneous.").
"' Farber & Sherry, supra note 14, at 838.
"' Luke 6:20-21, 24 (King James) the Holy Bible containing the old and new
testaments set forth in 1611 and commonly known as the King James Version.
"And he [Jesus] lifted up his eyes on his disciples, and said, blesed be ye poor.
for yours is the kingdom of God. Blessed are ye that hunger now: for ye shl be
filled ... But woe unto you who are rich! for ye have received your consolation."
32 Binny Ifller has criticized that "[ciritical lawyers proffer a naive vision of
clients, all of whom are pure of heart and eager to speak.... [CIritical lawyers
mostly write stories about idealized clients." Miller, cupra note 3, at 528. Miller
adds that "The critical analysis in recognizing only clients that make the job of
lawyering easy, provides little frame of reference for client stories that are neither
noble nor empowering." Miller, supra note 3, at 526.
u3 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2110.
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Dignity, Caring, Community and Rights,1 0 4 or like Mrs.
G., °5 who spent some additional money she received one
month on the children's Sunday shoes, and not on alcohol.
Unfortunately, the content of the client's story in many poverty
law cases involves alcoholism, drug addiction or abusive con-
duct.
Unquestionably, many poverty clients tell stories that are
full of elements of virtuosity and struggle. But an entire theory
of poverty law and the conveyance of clients' stories cannot ig-
nore that this group is not necessarily representative, and in
many cases, relation of a client's story imbued with normative
content may have prejudicial or embarrassing effects on the
client. In a case where, for example, the client is addicted to
drugs, it is imperative that the poverty lawyer interpret and
narrate the client's story. Without doing so, the poverty lawyer
cannot assure the client that resolution of the client's legal
issues will be untainted, or at least uncontrolled, by the nega-
tive realities of the client's life. 106
In these cases, the poverty lawyer's very job is, strictly
speaking, to "falsiffy] the normative content of [the client's]
story.""°7 Through this method of story-telling, the lawyer
serves as the funnel through which relevant and unbiasing
pieces of the client's story can flow. If the attorney fails to
erect this interpretive barrier between the client and the deci-
sion-making entity, the poverty lawyer has failed to perform
one of her most crucial roles: making sure that bias against
the poor, the addicted, the abusive, and the like does not enter
into a decision where it does not belong. Through this editing
process, the legal needs of the client can be presented; while
the other realities of the client's life, which might lead a tribu-
nal to conclude that the client does not "deserve" relief, can be
left out of the resolution process.
In these cases, the reconstructive practice of metaphor
suggested by Professor Alfieri,"' in which a more complete
104 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2111, 2114-18.
White, Subordination, supra note 3, at 21.
100 Of course I do not mean that the lawyer should lie to a tribunal about a
client's realities when those realities are relevant te determination of the legal
issue involved.
101 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2111.
100 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2138-39.
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account of the story is told, may be more harmful than helpful
to the client. Not all stories will include normative content
telling of a client's "struggle to survive while providing for nine
natural and foster children.""9 I had clients whose stories in-
cluded normative content of abuse and consequent loss of cus-
tody of as many children. This content did not dictate that
these clients were undeserving of relief under the Truth in
Lending Act, or were not entitled to general assistance or un-
employment compensation. Had I included normative content
in my narrative of their stories, these clients' cases might not
have been as persuasive, although ideally this content should
have played no role in the outcome of their cases. Similarly,
the reconstructive practice of redescription suggested by Pro-
fessor Alfieri," ° which "discredits traditional images of client
dependency by crediting client narratives of daily struggle," 1'
may be inappropriate where the normative content of the
client's story involves substantial elements of dependency or
addiction.
It is my belief that no formulaic approach to the presenta-
tion of a client's story can be suggested. In cases such as Mrs.
Celeste's, Mrs. G.'s or Ellen Smith's, where the client's story
imbued with normative content presents a picture of an arche-
typal "deserving"" poor person, the poverty attorney still
must decide what "deserving" aspects of the client's story
should be conveyed to the tribunal in order to achieve the
client's goals. Where the client's story imbued with normative
content depicts a person whom society might judge as unde-
serving because of addictive or other behavior, but who re-
mains legally entitled to relief, extraneous normative content
must be omitted for the benefit of the client. This approach
does not admit a traditional presupposition "that narratives of
client struggle are unusable in advocacy,"" but rather a rec-
ognition that the poverty attorney must selectively use narra-
tives of client struggle in advocacy. The decision must be made
on a case by case basis, taking into consideration the realities
"' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2138.
Uo Alfieri, supra note 2, at 214L
m Alfieri, supra note 2, at 214L
2 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2122 n. 55; Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty:
Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499 (1991).
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2123.
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of the individual client's life.
C. Earning the Right to Take Utilitarian Control of Story and
Situational Power over the Client
The act of taking utilitarian control of a client's story by
placing legal construct upon it is legitimate only if the attorney
distills and interprets the client's story toward the client's
goal. Thus, the reconstructive practice of metaphor sug-
gested by Professor Alfieri,"' which strives for fuller under-
standing of the client's story, is particularly essential in the
early stages of the lawyer-client relationship.
It is imperative that the poverty attorney avoid the process
of imposing legal construct on the client's story until the client
has determined her goal. This determination may at times
force the lawyer to take a less aggressive or public position
than the lawyer would like."6 For example, the poverty law-
yer may see the same bad conduct repeated by a potential
class defendant willing to settle individual cases. It is incum-
bent upon the poverty lawyer not to file a class action until she
finds a client willing to take on the role of class representative,
even though a class action might be more efficient and make
more sense."
7
Even more significantly, the client's goal may not be ob-
tainable through the legal system,"8 or may place nonremu-
un, See DAVID A. BINDER, ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS (1990); DAVID A.
BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1977).
US Professor Alfieri describes the reconstructive practice of metaphor as forcing
fuller understanding and telling of client story. Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2138-39.
US For example, Professor Alfieri mentions that he might have discussed with
his client "whether federal litigation best served her needs as a food stamp recipi.
ent and her aspirations as a foster parent." Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2189. Cer-
tainly this question should have been asked in the very early stages of developing
a legal strategy. Professor Lucie White observes that "in practice, welfare litigators
often subordinate their clients' perceptions of need to the lawyers' own agendas for
reform.... [L]itigation is designed to effect broad reforms that will benefit the
whole class of welfare recipients." White, Mobilization on the Margins, supra note
3, at 545. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic Gain or
Paternalistic Judgment: A Proposal for a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA. L,
REV. 761, 776-77 (1990).
U? Of course, more public avenues for addressing repeat conduct are often avail-
able, such as reports to state or federal agencies.
US See, e.g., William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Ne-
gotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L.
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nerative values over remunerative ones. 9 Moreover, the
relative importance of certain values may shift during the
course of a legal matter. For example, in one of her articles
Lucie White wrote about her client, Mrs. G.' Mrs. G. clearly
had multidimensional and conflicting goals." She thought
she did not want to repay, and certainly was not able to repay,
her alleged AFDC overpayment.' She felt a strong need to
communicate to the welfare bureaucracy and her attorney that
she did not mean to do anything wrong.' She felt the need
to justify her expenditure of her insurance money as money
spent on necessities, as defined by the welfare bureaucracy.
Mrs. G. satisfied these needs by explaining that she had pur-
chased new shoes for her children because their old shoes were
worn out.' But Mrs. G. also wished to confirm her own defi-
nition of necessity, which she accomplished when she ex-
plained for the first time in her hearing before an administra-
tive law judge that she had bought her children new shoes
because they needed shoes for church.' Undoubtedly, both
reasons for the shoe purchases were, at least in part, true.
Lucie White and Anthony Alfieri probably would agree
that an attorney needs to make efforts to create a space in
which a client can communicate values such as the necessity of
church shoes. 6 But Professor Alfieri would likely condemn
as interpretive violence a decision by Professor White, had she
Rsv. 1447, 1460-61 (1992).
' For example, a client may be willing to face the possibility of "losing" the
case in exchange for not forcing her child to testify on her behalf See, eg., Miller,
supra note 3, at 508. A client may not want to jeopardize the safety of an undoc-
umented co-worker. Lopez, supra note 3, at 1625. For a criticism of The Critical
View' for its failure to address the costs of reflexively valuing nonremunorative
goals (intrinsic goals), see, Tremblay, Tragic View, supra note 3, at 134. ("What
must be addressed, however, is the tradeoff that may result in any given law-
yer/client encounter between intrinsic and instrumental ends.").
12 White, Subordination, supra note 3.
1 Paul Tremblay has observed that Mrs. G.'s character and history was 'com-
plex and in flux.' Tremblay, Tragic View, supra note 3, at 130.
1 Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 615 (1932 &
Supp. I1 1984); White, Subordination, supra note 3, at 21-3L
White, Subordination, supra note 3, at 26, 29.
12 White, Subordination, supra note 3, at 30.
1' White, Subordination, supra note 3, at 31-32.
16 Again, not all clients will take this space despite the attornoy's efforts. For a
study critical of poverty attorneys for failure to make this space cea Hosticka,
supra note 37.
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been given the choice, not to emphasize the story in which
Mrs. G. bought the shoes for church, but to focus on the story
in which Mrs. G. purchased the shoes because the children's
other shoes were too old and worn." Poverty attorneys
should only be condemned, however, for the storytelling choices
they make if those choices are made without regard to client-
dictated priorities.
Based on Mrs. G.'s communicated primary desire to over-
turn the alleged AFDC overpayment and communicate that
she had not meant to do anything wrong, Professor White set
out to impose the AFDC legal paradigm on her client's story of
the expenditure of the insurance check. This choice, to present
the "my kids' old shoes were worn" story, was based on the
client's communicated priority. This choice should not lead to a
reflexive condemnation of Professor White's poverty practice,
even though the client's need to communicate her value on
church shoes, and not to contest the welfare power structure,
emerged as paramount in the hearing.
Professor Alfieri also would likely condemn Professor
White's practice for her failure to hear and to provide an ave-
nue for her client's story and voice, suggesting that had she
done so the "church shoes as necessity" value would have
emerged as paramount prior to the hearing and would have
controlled decisions made in Mrs. G.'s case. 1
Criticism of Professor White for not knowing and present-
ing the "church shoes" story suggests that, if given the oppor-
tunity, Mrs. G. could have assessed and presented stagnant
needs that would have remained constant throughout the
course of Professor White's representation. But I pose the al-
ternative analysis: that poverty clients, like all people, have
mutable and sometimes conflicting needs, all of which cannot
'2 In fact, Lucie White questions her own choices throughout the article. White,
Subordination, supra note 3.
' ' Professor Alfieri also believes that the priority choices initially made by Mrs.
G. were not made of her own free will. Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2129 (the poverty
lawyer mistakenly "views client obedience as a free and rational choice elected by
the client to maximize her well-being."). In earlier drafts of this Article, I began to
address the idea that clients can never determine and present their needs because
of their socio-economic and other power-dictated relation to their attorney. I ulti-
mately decided that this issue was complex, massive and discrete enough that it
deserved to be addressed individually, and not as part of an article on client sto-
ry.
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be met in the course of a lawsuit.' Therefore, the goal of
representation needs to be constant recognition of the changing
needs of a client, and strategy change and counsel in response
to these changes.
For example, if Mrs. G.'s church shoes story had emerged
as the story she would tell in the hearing, Professor White's
role, as Mrs. G.'s attorney, would be to recognize this choice
and to caution Mrs. G. that in the lawyer's best judgment, this
story might lead to an affirmation of the overpayment. More-
over, a discussion of the various conventional "needs" that
would be more likely to lead to a decision that there was no
overpayment would be necessary. " But to merely allow Mrs.
G. to tell her church shoes story without advising her of the
potential consequences of telling that story would be a total
abdication of Professor White's role as Mrs. G.'s attorney. Mrs.
G. can only be said to have made a real choice once she is ad-
vised of the likely legal consequences of the story choices she
thinks she wants to make.
This presentation of consequences gives the power of
choice to the client. Do the attorney and client tell the story
that is most likely to "win"13. or a story that may or may not
lead to a "win"? The client must make a judgment, informed by
the lawyer, as to whether story or assuredness of result is
more important.3 ' That the client might accede to the
I' James B. White has observed, "It is important to recognize that the client or
witness often has not one single story, which will be translated well or badly, but
a variety of possible ways to tell his story, among which choices must be made."
White, supra note 36, at 1396, n. 11. Similarly, Conley and OBarr have observed
in their study of small-claims litigants that at any particular point in time the
dispute is the account being given at that time. Each new account that the dispu-
tants give reflects somewhat different understandings, beliefs and emphases. Thus,
any account is both determined by what has gone before and determinative of the
present and future shape of the dispute. Conley & OBarr, supra note 49.
10 Julie Shapiro has observed that '[M] client's story can be presented as many
cases, some of which may win, while others will probably lose." Shapiro, cupra
note 57, at 887. She further observes: "Aore accurately, there may be ceveral
winning cases and several losing cases contained in any client's story." Shapiro,
supra note 57, at 887 n. 12. For discussion of the word "win" see infra note 131.
131 1 use the word "win" here in a conventional Pense. The conventional defini-
tion of a win in an overpayment hearing is to have the overpayment decision
overturned so that the client does not owe the government the money that other-
wise would have been deducted from the client's ongoing benefits.
" For an example of this choice between stories of varying eflectiveness see,
Richard Delgado, Storyteing For Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
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lawyer's judgment and tell a traditional story of need, and sup-
press for purposes of the overpayment hearing her definition of
church shoes as a necessity, does not mean that the lawyer has
silenced the client's voice. It means that the lawyer has realis-
tically outlined the possible consequences of speaking different
stories.
In order to hear and promote the telling of a client's story
in the early stages of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
must, to some extent, adapt to the different storytelling styles
of her clients. Hearing client story, however, does not implicate
a complete abdication of direction by the lawyer. In many cas-
es, the client's storytelling may leave out pieces that are indis-
pensable to legal analysis of the client's problem. The client
may organize his or her story randomly rather than chronologi-
cally. He or she may use pronouns instead of nouns, or skip
over incidents that seem irrelevant to him or her. These modes
of storytelling are not susceptible to placement of legal con-
struct, though not problematic in other settings.
Environmental realities affecting client storytelling un-
doubtedly must be taken into consideration. It would be unre-
alistic to think that being in a law office, in front of a lawyer,
has no impact on storytelling by the client. It is entirely possi-
ble that events in the legal aid office, such as the intake inter-
view, may cause the client to tell her story in an oblique or
halting style, such as that described by Professor Alfieri."
But a client's withholding or distorting elements of his or her
87 MIH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). In one case Delgado discusses, the client chose to
pursue a strategy that systematically attacked the prison discipline system, as
opposed to mounting a procedural challenge to the discipline assessed against him.
Id. at 2467. Similarly, Robert Dinerstein writes of a case where the client's ex-
pressed desire was to tell her story, which presented a defense to battery not
recognized by the law, even though telling her story greatly increased her chances
of a prison sentence. Dinerstein, supra note 30, at 973. See also Miller, supra note
3, at 503-04, 513. Paul Tremblay speaks of this choice by the client as "informed
consent." Tremblay, Tragic View, supra note 3, at 135-37. For a discussion of the
importance of the lawyer's role in encouraging the client to explore issues such as
what needs can be met through representation see, Lopez, supra note 3, at 1613.
Binny Miller has criticized that "clients are nearly always assumed to want to
win, whatever the trade-offs." Miller, supra note 3, at 501. She recommends a
greater role for the client in shaping goal and case theory towards achieving client
goal. Miller supra note 3, at 501-02.
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2122. For consideration of lawyer conduct leading to
the invention of memories the client believes the lawyer seeks see, Stephen
Eliman, Lawyers and Client, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 742-43 (1987).
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story cannot be viewed as the pure consequence of lawyer
conduct.1" Other individual or cultural factors cannot be dis-
counted. For example, many of my Native American clients did
not tell linear or chronological stories. Even at the first inter-
view, I often had to place their stories on a timeline in order to
analyze their legal claims. Thus, while the poverty attorney
must be aware of her conduct with clients in an effort not to
silence the client, the conduct of the poverty attorney should
not be viewed as the only factor leading to client conduct in
storytelling. It would be egocentric to think that poverty law-
yers are the cause of every client behavior.
Even in the goal-defining stages of the lawyer-client rela-
tionship, power over client story, through control over defining
relevance and irrelevance, must be shared by the client and
the lawyer. The story the client tells must be the story that the
poverty attorney first hears,1" although it may not be the
same story that ultimately is told in advocacy. But if, after
hearing completely the client's story, the lawyer does not seek
to embellish the story with legally relevant information, the
later control over relevance and irrelevance, speech and silence
that I believe is an integral part of the lawyer's role loses its
legitimacy.
The lawyer direction needed to obtain from the client all
the information necessary to legal analysis differs from the
paradigmatic re-telling that will necessarily occur later, once
the client's goals have been defined and possibly re-defined.
The lawyer must not impose legal paradigms under the guise
of obtaining information necessary to applying legal theory.
The lawyer must seek to bring out those aspects of the client's
story meaningful to the client, and those aspects of the client's
story meaningful to legal interpretation, so that the two can be
brought together to distill continuously client goal and legal
content of story in furtherance of that goal.'
This process can be performed in a way that silences and
marginalizes if the lawyer silences the client's notion of rele-
"I Professor Alfieri suggests that [the client's] withholding is engendered by
the lawyer." Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2126; see also, Gilkerson, supra note 3.
" Professor Alfieri condemns his own practices for not hearing the story told
by his client and for not telling the story told by his client. Alfieri, supm note 2,
at 2110. I believe his self-criticism is valid only in regard to the former assertion.
"' Lopez, supra note 3, at 1614.
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vance rather than encouraging the client through questioning.
A lawyer who repeatedly asks 'Do you understand?""3  con-
veys an expectation of low intelligence and truncated, yes-or-no
answers. On the other hand, the storytelling process can be
synergistic, resulting in a picture of the client's story consisting
of normative interpretation by the client and lawyer exper-
tise.1" It is essential to this synergy that the lawyer and cli-
ent not seek to establish a common interpretive standpoint."'
Given the experiential differences between the two, this result
is impossible. Rather, they should each seek to bring their full
knowledge to each other, ready to have their preconceptions
modified by the other."0 When the client and the lawyer
' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2112-13.
,' See Lopez, supra note 3, at 1613. Clark Cunningham refers to this attorney
practice as being a good translator through collaboration. Cunningham, supra note
30, at 1301.
.. Alfieri, supra, note 2, at 2141.
140 See Felstiner & Sarat, supra note 118, at 1454-55; Alfieri, supra note 2, at
2141-42. It should be noted that the "initial interview" I speak of here is not the
eligibility interview required by the Legal Services Corporation. It is an unfortu.
nate but unavoidable fact of poverty law practice that many people who desper-
ately need legal representation will be turned away before they even have a
chance to tell their story, and that those who will eventually be given a chance to
tell their story will first be faced with a barrage of seemingly meaningless ques-
tions regarding income, household size, employment status, and the like.
Although this eligibility interview delays the telling of client story, and in
some cases may deny a person the status of client altogether, it is disingenuous to
suggest that this constitutes part of a sinister methodology that ignores client
need and seeks to squelch client story. Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2112; Gilkerson,
supra note 3, at 895. Rather, this eligibility grilling is a by-product of governmen-
tal definition of poverty and worthiness, a separate but unrelated problem to that
of lawyer-client dynamics.
Furthermore, in my experience, the eligibility interview customarily is con-
ducted by someone other than the attorney or paralegal who will perform the frst
substantive interview. It is not customary for the initial substantive interviewer to
re-ask all of the eligibility questions. This practice can perpetuate and exacerbate
the frustrations caused by focus on eligibility in the initial client contact with
legal aid, and further delays impartation of the client's story. Alfieri, supra note 2,
at 2113. By writing of his re-inquiry into eligibility, Alfieri creates the image of an
impersonal, well-oiled machine where eligibility information continues to be more
important than client story. In my experience, this emphasis on technical eligibili-
ty questions is not the norm. But see, Hosticka, supra note 37, at 603-04. There is
also no reason to force clients to wait half a day in the legal aid office, as they
do in the welfare offices, between the eligibility interview and their first substan-
tive interview unless they have a problem that requires legal attention that day
(such as a hearing the next day or an immediately effective reduction in or termi-
nation of benefits). Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2112. I know that this is a common
problem in large urban legal aid offices. In future works I hope to study the
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bring together their knowledge-the client of the story and the
lawyer of the law-lawyer control over tribunal story-telling is
legitimized. It becomes a tool for assisting, rather than op-
pressing, the client.
II. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF PRECONSTRUCTIVE PRACTICES
The final analytic step to any theory of practice must be
practical application itself."' Because Professor Alfieri has
posed suggestions for practice to realize the ideologies ex-
pressed by theoretics of practice scholars, I have in this section
applied the specific practice suggestions regarding story made
by him in his article, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice."
Professor Alfieri describes some application of his theory to
Mrs. Celeste's case; but how would the various reconstructive
practices he suggests play out in the two disparate cases I
describe at the beginning of this Article? The first client about
whom I write, Ellen Smith, might be thought of as the classic
"good" poor person of biblical and political rhetoric. She grew
from being an alcoholic who could not take care of her children
into a woman with strong family ties, a good job, and prospects
for continued growth. She worked hard, had a purpose in her
life, and remained poor nevertheless. She was capable of exten-
sive participation in her lawsuit to regain custody of her
daughter. The other clients about whom I write, John and
methodologies of legal services offices and make suggestions for eliminating these
dehumanizing aspects.
I do not address in this Article the issues raised by care acceptance policies
dictating choices between eligible clients. Although traditional interpretive practices
clearly play a role in this process, I do not believe that legal aid stafrs choose
cases based primarily on which clients are worthy of representation, as suggested
by some authors, but rather choose their cases after trying to determine in which
cases a lawyer is most likely to be able to effectuate a result for the client.
Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2122; Gilkerson, supra note 3, at 895. In a number of
cases, nothing can be done through the legal system for the client. Regarding
resource allocation in legal services see Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverishcd Practices
81 GEo. L.J. 2567 (1993); Tremblay, Tragic VIrew, supra note 3; Paul R. Tremblay,
Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV.
1101 (1990).
" Conventional critical practice theory has been criticized for its emphasis on
theory over practice. See Margulies, supra note 99, at 697, 715; cce also, Catherine
Mac]innon, From Practice to Theory or What is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALE
J. L. & FEMINISM 13 (1991); Miller, supra note 3, at 489.
"' Alfieri, supra note 2.
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Jane Baker, were entitled to relief in their dispute with their
mortgagee. Nonetheless, the normative content of their lives
included domestic violence, alcoholism and an inability to par-
ticipate in meaningful aspects of finalizing their case (such as
showing up to meet the termite inspector before the sale of
their house closed).
If I had engaged in "play"" with each of these clients,
the results would have been strikingly different. In my rela-
tionship with Ellen, the act of play would have been viewed by
her, I believe, as an abdication of my duty to make suggestions
to her. She did not know what options were available to her
when she sought legal advice, and if I had asked her to pro-
pose options, as opposed to asking what she wanted, she prob-
ably would not have come to trust me as she did. Our relation-
ship involved synergy rather than play. She told me she did
not want her child to go back to the child's father. I told her
about emergency temporary orders, the legal requirements
before a substantive hearing would be held, and what kinds of
witnesses we should try to find to present to the court. We
worked together every step of the way. Perhaps this process
mirrors what Professor Alfieri refers to as play.
In the case of John and Jane Baker, had I engaged in a
practice that left decisionmaking to the clients, no resolution of
their case would likely have been reached because, like many
of my clients, they had other, more immediate and essential
issues to deal with on a daily basis. It was very difficult to get
them to focus on the details of resolving their case when they
were consumed by the effects of alcohol and domestic violence.
Similarly, my ability to tell fuller client story... or to in-
tegrate client-spoken narrative into the public storytelling of
advocacy'45 differed in these two cases. In Ellen's case, her
chances of winning increased with inclusion of aspects of her
story. But in the case of the Bakers, certain aspects of the
normative content of their lives had no place in the resolution
"4 Play is defined by Professor Alfieri as reordering the "discursive and
decisionmaking arrangements (for example who poses questions and recommends
options)." Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2137.
"' Professor Alfieri refers to this practice as "metaphor" and "redescription."
Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2138-39, 2145.
iS Professor Alfieri calls this practice "collaboration." Alfieri, supra note 2, at
2140.
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of the issues raised by their foreclosure. In fact, I spent some
time trying to keep their domestic issues out of resolution of
their foreclosure since I felt these issues would only embarrass
and hinder them. In Ellen's case, fuller client story helped
reach her goal. In the Bakers' case, fuller client story would
have made it hard to attain their goal.
In Ellen's case, emplacement 4 ' actually played a signifi-
cant role in the case when she asked to make a statement to
the judge on her own before the judge's final custody decision.
Her expressed desire for custody of her daughter, her descrip-
tion of the work she had done in her life since losing custody of
her daughter, and her plea for a change of custody were more
eloquent and effective than any closing argument I could possi-
bly have made. This does not mean that she would have want-
ed to be emplaced in any other aspect of the case, such as
negotiation or examination of witnesses.
In the Bakers' case, I do not think, in my professional
judgment, that emplacement would have been productive to-
wards their expressed goals. This conclusion was certainly a
value judgment on my part, but the clients asked for my help
partially so that they could avail themselves of my experienced
judgment regarding what tactics should and should not be
used. In any event, I do not believe these clients wanted to
engage in direct negotiation with the mortgagee. They had
already tried direct negotiation. This is why they hired me in
the first place.
CONCLUSION
By hearing the client's story, understanding the client's
goals, and interpreting the client's story by placing it in a legal
construct, the poverty lawyer is providing his or her client with
the very same service that client might expect if he or she was
paying for legal services. By doing so, the poverty lawyer pro-
tects the client by making sure that legal construct is placed
on the client's story by the party most attuned to the client's
desires.
When imposing legal construct on the clients story in the
1,s Professor Alfieri defines this practice as direct care work by the client.
Alfier supra note 2, at 2145.
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act of representation obtains the objectives of safeguarding a
client's rights,14 the client's opponent is subject to the level-
ing effect of representation in the legal arena. There is no
question that the cost of doing so is usually presentation of
truncated or interpreted client story. But given the choice
between presentation of full story regardless of its impact on
legal outcome, and presentation of interpreted story, distilled
for legal content, I believe most clients would choose presenta-
tion of a distilled story.
In my experience, the legacy of winning a case for a client
is empowerment through access to the '"ired guns" that others
can afford."' Because the act of legal representation gives
the attorney only situational power over the client and utili-
tarian control of story, the attorney does not have the power to
tarnish client integrity,' lose client story,' or render the
client powerless.' Put simply, the roles we play in our
clients' lives-even essential roles such as preserving housing
or helping a client obtain or retain custody of a child-are not
integral to the self-definition of the client, although the results
we procure for our clients may have lasting effects. The great-
est and most dangerous power we have is not the power to
redefine the client, but the power to lose the client's case and
make the client's life harder.
52
If I learned anything in legal services practice, it is that
poverty, like all things, has many faces-industriousness and
languor, kindness and harshness, virtue and vice, honesty and
147 In his article, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, Professor Alfieri observes that despite his self-proclaimed interpretive
violence, the tactics and strategies he employed "satisfied the twin objectives of
safeguarding [the client's] entitlement to food stamps and invalidating federal regu-
lations abrogating the entitlement." Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2110.
... See White, Mobilization on the Margins, supra note 3, at 545. (The
knowledge that litigation has been filed on their behalf "can jar the dreary inevi-
tability of the status quo. It can confirm that the conditions of their lives are not
fair and give them hope that things need not remain as they have always been.").
"' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2119.
11 Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2119.
"' Alfieri, supra note 2, at 2147.
112 This calls into serious question Christopher Gilkerson's conclusion that "Itihe
[poverty] lawyer . . . needs to accept that litigation failure may result paradoxical-
ly in representational success." Gilkerson, supra note 3, at 916. If the litigation is
undertaken based on the client's desires then litigation success will be representa-
tional success.
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deceit, intelligence and stupidity, dependence and power.'
Through my clients, I learned that no formulaic way exists for
poverty lawyers to deal with poverty clients, except to try to
treat them with the same respect and individuality given by
non-poverty lawyers to their clients. I do not believe that pov-
erty attorneys should, in the name of client empowerment, fail
to perform the role of attorney by failing to decide relevance
and irrelevance in tribunal storytelling, failing to impose legal
paradigm on client story, failing to provide leadership in case-
related decisionmaking, or failing to make ultimate strategic
decisions.
Poverty law clients seek out poverty attorneys because
they have legal problems, and because poverty attorneys are
trained as lawyers. Poverty law clients need poverty lawyers to
obtain for them the legal results to which they are entitled. To
assume that poverty clients also need poverty attorneys for
normative validation and conveyance, or to assume that if
poverty attorneys take control in the legal setting poverty
clients are disempowered and marginalized in all other set-
tings, conceives for poverty attorneys a paternalistically great-
er role than poverty attorneys have in their clients' lives. Most
dangerously, these assumptions lead to practice suggestions
which ignore the very reason clients seek the help of poverty
attorneys-because they are attorneys.
'3 Peter Margulies has observed, "No orthodosy captures the richness of the
stories which walk into a law school clinic." M rgulies, supra note 99, at 704. 7he
same could be said for a legal aid office.
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